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COPYRIGHT LAW-WILL THE DENIAL OF COPYRIGHT TO AN
AUTHOR'S RESEARCH IMPEDE SCHOLARSHIP? MILLER v. UNIVER
SAL CITY STUDIOS, INC, 605 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981).

I.

INTRODUCTION

"Patents and copyrights approach, nearer than any other class of
cases belonging to forensic discussions, to what may be called the
metaphysics ofthe law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be,
very subtile and refined, and, sometimes, almost evanescent."1

Gene Miller, a reporter for the Miami Herald, persuaded Bar
bara Mackle,2 a kidnap victim, to publish the story of the ordeal that
she had suffered at the hands of her abductors. Ms. Mackie related
the details of the event to Miller, who used them to create a book
entitled, 83 Hours Till Dawn. 3 A producer for Universal City Stu
dios read a condensed version of.Miller's book,4 thought the story
would make a good television movie, and gave a copy of the book to
a scriptwriter who immediately began writing a screenplay.5 In Feb
ruary, 1972, the producer for Universal City Studios approached
Miller for the film rights. Negotiations promptly ensued, but no
1. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, J.).
2. Mackie was staying in an Atlanta motel with her mother due to overcrowding in
the college infirmary caused by a flu epidemic. Her abductors took her into the Georgia
woods and buried her alive in a coffin-like, self-ventilating box. She remained in the box
for four days and was rescued on the fifth day shortly before the life support system
would have failed. Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 984, 984-85 (S.D.
Fla. 1978), rev'd, 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981).
3. Miller conducted personal research and numerous interviews with the partici
pants in the kidnapping. He estimated expending more than 2500 hours in research,
preparation and writing 83 Hours Till Dawn. The writing style used by Miller in his
book was similar to that employed in recent criminal novels and historical documenta
ries. See, e.g., Truman Capote's In Cold Blood and Cornelius Ryan's The Longest Day.
Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 984, 985 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd, 650
F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981).
4. The original book was published in 1971 and was copyrighted with a condensed
version in Reader's Digest and a serialization in the Ladies Home Journal. Miller v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1367 (5th Cir. 1981).
5. Id. In January, 1972, William Frye, a producer for Universal City Studios, gave
a copy of Miller's book to a scriptwriter named Gerard who never returned it. Miller v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 984, 985 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd, 650 F.2d 1365
(5th Cir. 1981).
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agreement was reached. 6 Universal City Studios later produced and
aired on national television a movie entitled, The Longest Night.
Miller consequently brought suit claiming infringement of
copyright. 7
At trial, Miller testified to numerous similarities between the
book and the television movie. The jury, which had been given cop
ies of the book and which had viewed the movie twice during the
trial, found copyright infringement and awarded Miller damages
and lost profits in excess of twenty-thousand dollars. 8 Defendants
strenuously objected to the jury instruction that research in the prep
aration of a book is copyrightable. 9 The trial judge denied defend
ants' motion for a new trial, whereupon, defendants appealed. The
Fifth Circuit, in Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 10 reversed the
lower court and stated: "This instruction, at best confusing, at worst
wrong, was given with some reluctance by the trial court over the
strenuous objection of defendants on the urging by plaintiff, 'That's
the heart of the case.' "11 The Miller court 12 declared that while
there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of copyright in
fringement and a judgment for plaintiff, such an instruction con
tained an erroneous view of the law and constituted a reversible
error.13 The appellate court reversed the lower court's verdict for
plaintiff and remanded the case for a new trial. The importance of
6. Id. at 985-86.
7. The scriptwriter, Gerard, claimed that he used the Reader's Digest article in
writing much of the script before receiving a transcript of the trial court proceedings. He
used the transcript to check his facts. By April 21, 1972, a full run script was completed
and Gerard admitted to using the book itself after April 5th to check factual details not
available elsewhere. He testified to the belief that Universal City Studios and Miller had
reached an agreement upon which Gerard relied in writing the screenplay. Particularly
damning evidence against defendants was a memo sent from Gerard to Frye on March 7,
1972, confessing that the news stories available were far too general and contained al
most no detail to support the scenes written. Consequently, all that was available, and all
that Gerard used, was Miller's book and such use was forbidden. Id. at 986.
8. Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1367 (5th Cir. 1981).
9. Id. at 1367-68. The district trial court judge instructed the jury, in part, that:
Similarly, in a case like the instant one, which deals with factual matters such as
news events, the facts themselves are not copyrightable but the form of expres
sion of the facts and their arrangement and selection are copyrightable. More
over, If an author, in writing a book concerning factual mailers, engages in
research on those mailers, his research is copyrightable.
.
Id. at 1368 (emphasis in original).
10. 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981).
II. Id. at 1368.
12. In order to distinguish the trial and appellate court decisions, throughout this
note the "Miller court" will be used to designate the decision of the appellate court.
13. 650 F.2d at 1368.
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the erroneous instruction was underscored by the realization that it
was embedded in a field of otherwise proper instructions. 14
In its decision that research by an author is not protected by
copyright, the court of appeals in Miller drew a distinction between
uncopyrightable facts and the copyrightable expression of facts. 15 In
reaching this decision, the appellate court relied heavily on the
premise that research involved only the gathering of facts without
any degree of self-expression. 16 In contrast to the appellate court's
narrow definition of research, the trial court in Miller v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 17 had held that such research was protected by
copyright. IS The trial court freely recognized the traditional copy
right truism that facts and events are in themselves not copyright
able. Thus, it did not seek to challenge the distinction between facts
and expression. 19 The essence of the trial court's decision was its
perception of the nature of research: "The court views the labor and
expense of the research involved in the obtaining of those un
copyrightable facts to be intellectually distinct from those facts and
more similar to the expression of the facts than to the facts them
selves."2o Research was viewed by the trial court as more than a
mere gathering of facts; it was viewed as involving some degree of
intellectual effort and self-expression. 21 The court noted that if the
public expects individuals to labor on its behalf to obtain factual
knowledge, then the public must be prepared to compensate them in
the same manner as those who give expression to facts.22 Another
key difference between the appellate and trial court decisions was the
trial court's refusal to fear the creation of a monopoly in factual ma
terial if research was held to be copyrightable. 23
14. Id. at 1367.
15. Id. at 1371-72.
16. Id. at 1372.

17. 460 F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd, 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981).
18. Id. at 988.
19. Id. at 987.
20. Id. In further explaining this distinction, the court quoted the Second Circuit
which said that the distinction in copyright between the expression of an idea and the
idea is an attempt" 'to reconcile two competing societal interests: rewarding an individ
ual's ingenuity and effort while at the same time permitting the nation to benefit from
further improvements or progress resulting from others' use of the same subject matter.' "
Id. at 987-88 (quoting Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d
Cir.), urI. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976».
21. Id. at 987.
22. 460 F. Supp. at 988.
23.
It further appears to the court that other individuals are not deprived of
the opportunity of obtaining knowledge of facts by one individual's copyright
of his research of those facts and that therefore the nation may still benefit from
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This note will highlight the flaws in the rationale utilized by the
appellate court in its denial of copyright protection to the research of
an author. The constitutional and statutory history of the current
copyright law will be examined to provide perspective on the major
purpose of copyright protection. Next, the reasoning of the appellate
court will be analyzed to determine the primary goals of the decision
and the impact that such a decision will have on the current work of
authors. Finally, this note will discuss the manner in which the ex
tension of copyright protection to an author's research is supported
by both the policies of copyright protection and existing case law.

II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Constitutional Foundation

of Copyright

When the drafters of the Constitution met in Philadelphia in
1787, the importance of encouraging an author's intellectual effort
by protecting the fruits of his labor from theft had long been recog
nized. 24 The primary concern of the drafters was to benefit the pub
lic by promoting the production of literary, scientific and artistic
works.25 To encourage such production, the Constitution granted
power to the newly created Congress to enact legislation that would
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries."26 This clause encompassed
the power to grant patent as well as copyright protection.27
further improvements or progress resulting from other individuals' use of those
facts.
Id.

24. See A. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 2-3 (5th ed. 1979). Copyright law as
related to literary and artistic property is essentially an inheritance from England. From
medieval times the author's right to his or her manuscript was recognized on principles of
equity and natural justice. With the invention of printing, works could be produced in
quantity for circulation. And the author lost his protection as soon as the work got into
print. This injustice ultimately led to the first copyright statute. See id. Contra L. PAT
TERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 143-50 (1968).
By the close of the American Revolution, every state except Delaware had passed
laws to protect authors. These laws, however, were limited in operation to the bounda
ries of their respective states. Thus, an author in one state who wished to secure protec
tion for his work throughout the states, was obliged to travel to every state and comply
with its individual copyright statute. A. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 4 (5th ed. 1979).
25. "The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by per
sonal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.''' Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
27. Copyright differs from patent essentially in subject matter, conditions of pro
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The copyright clause was not enacted as a rigid standard against
which all copyright legislation was to be measured. Rather, it was
designed to be flexible and to suggest certain minimal elements to be
contained in copyright statutes. 28 Future statutes were intended to
be malleable to the necessities of changing times. 29 The introductory
phrase, "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . ."
was intended to be read expansively and was not intended to be con
strued as a constitutional limitation upon the scope of the works pro
tected. 30 The phrase was to be a preamble, setting forth the purpose
of the power rather than the limitation of its exercise. 31
Within the constitutional framework, the subject matter of
copyright must possess two essential elements: The work must be
the original creation of an "author";32 and "[t]he work must consti
tute a 'writing,' that is, it must be fixed in some tangible form from
which the work can be reproduced."33
The first element demands that the work, in order to be pro
tected by copyright, be the product of original, creative authorship.
There are two interrelated components: originality34 and creativ
tection, and extent of protection afforded. Basically, patents are granted for machines,
processes, devices and instruments, but only after the United States Patent Office has
searched the "prior art" and determined that the invention is, among other things, novel
and unique. Copyrights are not granted by any government agency, but are created by
the actions of the author. The author may register his copyright with the United States
Copyright Office, but his claim is not verified by a search of earlier registrations. The
copyrighted work need not be novel, nor be an invention, it need only be "original," that
is, created without copying. Patent is the greater monopoly. The patentee may exclude
anyone from the field covered by the patent, however independently the latter may have
developed the same invention. Under copyright, a person working independently would
not infringe the original work, no matter how identical, so long as the subsequent author
could prove that he had created his work without any knowledge or reference to the
original author'S work. A. LATMAN, supra note 24, at 1-2.
28. I M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 1-30 (rev. ed. 1982).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1-30.2.
32. M. PETERS, GENERAL GUIDE TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976 at 3:1 (1977).
An author is any person who creates a work by means of his own original effort. I M.
NIMMER, supra note 28, at 1-37.
33. M. PETERS, supra note 32, at 3: 1.
34. I M. NIMMER, supra note 28, at 2-2-5 to 2-15. Under the 1909 Act, originality
was neither defined nor expressly required. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075
(amended 1976). The courts, however, have consistently inferred from the United States
Constitution that originality is a prerequisite to copyright protection since it can only be
claimed by authors. See, e.g., Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910-11 (2d
Cir. 1980). Since an author is defined as the originator, beginner or creator of the work,
it must follow that originality is essential to copyrightability of a work. Under the Copy
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ity.3S "The work must be original in the sense that the author pro
duced it by his own intellectual effort, as distinguished from merely
copying a preexisting work. There is no requirement of novelty, in
genuity, or esthetic merit."36 Therefore, a work may be original even
if it is in every respect identical to a work already in existence, so
long as the author can prove that his work originated solely and in
dependently by means of his own creative effort. 37 A work's origi
nality, as demonstrated by skill, training, knowledge, and judgment
alone, will not support an author's claim that the work is copyright
able. Only when those qualities are utilized in the act of authorship
will they support such a claim, for it is only an author who may
qualify for copyright protection. 38 The quantum of creativity de
manded is minimal. Any distinguishable variation from a prior
work will suffice as long as the variation is the product of the au
thor's independent creative labor.39
The second essential element in a work for which an author
seeks copyright protection requires that the work be in the form of a
"writing."40 The writing requirement has been liberally construed by
the courts in order to give it a content sufficient to encompass the
artistic and technological developments of contemporary society.41
right Act of 1976, copyright is granted only to "original works of authorship." Copyright
Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
35. M. PETERS, supra note 32, at 3:1.
36. Id.
37. This principle of copyright law was best expressed by Judge Learned Hand
who stated: "if by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew
Keats' [sic] Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an 'author,' and, if he copyrighted it,
others might not copy that poem, though they might of course copy Keats' [sic]." Shel
don v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir.) (citations omitted), cerl.
denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936).
38. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, III U.S. 53, 58-59 (1884). The
copyright requirement of originality must be distinguished from the patent requirement
of novelty. Since originality is more easily proven than novelty, a copyright is more
easily protected than a patent, although the scope of the rights protected is more narrow.
Where a patent owner can prove infringement merely by showing substantial similarity,
the copyright owner must prove both substantial similarity and copying. See Sheldon v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49,54 (2d Cir. 1936), cerl. denied, 298 U.S. 669
(1936).
39. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903); Amster
dam v. Triangle Publications, 189 F.2d 104, 106 (3rd Cir. 1951); Alfred Bell & Co. v.
Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951); Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp.,
150 F.2d 512,513 (2d Cir. 1945).
40. M. PETERS, supra note 32, at 3: I.
41. The basic rationale for the constitutional interpretation of ''writings'' was set
out in Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, Inc., 276 F. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). In Reiss,
Judge Hand denied the proposition that the courts should follow inflexibly the language
of the Constitution as understood in 1789, and stated:
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The Supreme Court, consistent with the policy of liberal construc
tion, has stated that" 'writings' . . . include any physical rendering
of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor."42 The scope
of a writing has not been limited to printed or written works, but has
been held to include all forms of writing, printing, engraving, and
etching. 43 In addition, works of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural art
are included within the Court's definition.44 Visual perception of the
writing is not an essential prerequisite, for the Supreme Court has
held that sound recordings of artistic performances constitute writ
ings in the constitutional sense.45 Thus, any form of a work that can
be reproduced or otherwise copied will suffice to qualify the work in
the constitutional sense of the term.
The writings of authors, therefore, are the basic constitutional
essentials as to the scope of copyrightable works. While the value of
copyright protection has been recognized since the inception of the
republic, the statutory scope of the protection has undergone a meta
morphosis commencing with the enactment of the first federal copy
right statute in 1790.46 The list of works subject to copyright
protection has been expanded constantly over the years, yet the pa
rameters of copyright protection remain obscure.47
B.

Statutory Foundation

of Copyright

Congress, in carrying out its constitutional mandate "[t]o pro
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . ,"48 has enacted
seven major copyright statutes. The first copyright act in 1790 ex
tended protection to the author or his assigns, of any book, map or
[I]ts grants of power to Congress comprise, not only what was then known, but
what the ingenuity of men should devise thereafter. Of course, the new subject
matter must have some relation to the grant; but we interpret it by the general
practices of civilized peoples in similar fields, for it is not a straight-jacket, but a
charter for a living people.
Id. at 719.
42. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
43. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903). In
Bleislein the Supreme Court upheld the copyrightability of a circus poster used for ad
vertising purposes. Id. at 252. The Supreme Court also held that a photograph is a
writing in the constitutional sense. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, III U.S.
53, 60 (1884).
44. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 562 n.17 (1973).
45. Id.
46. The Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (current version at 17 U.S.c.
§§ 101-810 (1976».
47. See A. LATMAN, supra note 24, at 22-24.
48. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 8.
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chart for a period of fourteen years. 49 Gradually, the scope of the
protection under the 1790 Act has been enlarged to keep pace with
advances in science and literature.50 For example, additions in
cluded the following: in 1802, prints;51 in 1831, musical composi
tions;52 in 1856, dramatic compositions;53 in 1865, photographs;54
and in 1870, paintings, drawings, sculpture, and models or designs
for works of the fine arts.55 The most recent stage in this enlarge
ment was the Copyright Act of 1909. 56 The language of the 1909 Act
extended copyright protection to "all the writings of an author."57
This language created considerable confusion as to the extent of the
protection afforded. 58 Thus, in a recent enactment, Congress delib
erately avoided use of the phrase. 59 Congress provided instead, in
section 102 of the 1976 Copyright Act, for the protection of "original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression."60
The 1976 Act further clarified the scope of the protection afforded to
writings by enumerating a list of illustrative categories under which
a work might be included. This list was expressly declared to be
illustrative and non-limitative. 61 The belief that Congress sought to
exercise its full constitutional power to cover all possible works was
supported by the argument that the language of the 1909 Act echoed
the Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution. 62 Congress,
however, had done little to clarify the cryptic phraseology in the
1909 Act. 63 The ambiguity of the 1909 Act presumably was laid to
49. The Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, I Stat. 124 (current version at 17 u.s.c.
§§ 101-810 (1976».
50. See A. LATMAN, supra note 24, at 7-14; Solberg, Copyright Law Reform, 35
YALE L.J. 48 (1925).
51. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171.
52. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16,4 Stat. 436.
53. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, II Stat. 138.
54. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540.
55. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198.
56. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (amended 1976) [hereinafter cited
as 1909 Act].
57. /d. § 4; see a/so id. §§ 5, 7.
58. A. LATMAN, supra note 24, at 22-24.
59. 17 U.S.c. § 102(a) (1976). The removal of such language was designed to
"avoid exhausting the constitutional power of Congress to legislate in this field and to
eliminate the uncertainties" arising from the ''writings of an author" terminology. S.
REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
51 (1976).
60. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976).
61. Id.
62. A. LATMAN, supra note 24, at 22-24.
63. The drafting committee of the House of Representatives attempted to clarify
their choice of words by stating:
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rest by the Supreme Court in Goldstein v. California. 64 The Court, in
a five-to-four decision, stated that in the sixty years since the enact
ment of the 1909 Act, neither the Copyright Office, the courts, nor
the Congress had interpreted the scope of copyright protection to be
as broad as the language of the 1909 Act.65
The 1976 Act declares that, "[c)opyright protection subsists, in
accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression . . . ."66 The first half of this
delineation uses the phrase "original works of authorship" to define
the scope of copyrightable works. Congress elected not to exercise
its full authority to extend copyright protection to all the possible
writings of an author.67 Nevertheless, works of authorship are not
limited to the seven broad categories of works listed under section
102(a) of the 1976 Act. 68 Congress purposely left the phrase unde
fined 69 so as to create a flexible standard. Thus, when applying the
standard, courts have the discretion to extend protection to types of
works either not expressly mentioned in section 102(a) or not yet in
existence. The second half of the 1976 Act's delineation declares
that applicable works must be "fixed in any tangible medium of ex
pression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device."70 Fixation in tangible form is
both a statutory and constitutional necessity, for unless a work can
be reduced to tangible form it cannot be interpreted as a writing
Section 4 is declaratory of existing law. It was suggested that the word "works"
should be substituted for the word "writings" in view of the broad construction
given by the courts to the word "writings," but it was thought better to use the
word "writings" which is the word found in the Constitution. It is not intended
by the use of this word to change in any way the construction which the courts
have given to it.
H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1909). See also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201, 210 n.18 (1954),
64. 412 U.S. 546 (1973),
65. Id. at 567.
66. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976).
67. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
68. The list is meant to illustrate, not to limit, and is not drafted to exhaust the
scope of "original works of authorship" that the bill is intended to protect. H.R. REP.
No, 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976),
69. ''The bill does not intend either to freeze the scope of copyrightable technology
or to allow unlimited expansion into areas completely outside the present congressional
intent." Id. at 51.
70. 17 U.S,c' § 102(a) (1976).
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within the meaning of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution. 71
There remain two concepts which are essential to a thorough
understanding of the scope of statutory copyright. The first is the
distinction between the work itself and the material object in which
the work is embodied.72 Such a material object is either a copy or a
phonorecord. 73 While an individual author may own the copyright
in the work of his creation, he does not necessarily own the material
object in which it is embodied. The second and more important con
cept is the dichotomy between an idea and the expression of an
idea. 74 The distinction between idea and expression is the most criti
cal and elusive principle in copyright law. 75 It applies not only to the
question of whether a work is copyrightable, but also to the question
of infringement. Simply stated, an idea may never be copyrighted; it
is only the expression of an idea that may be copyrightedJ6 This
distinction was granted express statutory recognition for the first
time in the 1976 Act. 77 The value of an idea to society is so precious,
that where the idea and its expression have become so fused as to be
inseparable, the law will deny copyright to the expression. 78 Ideas,
like facts, are essential to the welfare and progress of society. They
will be zealously protected from monopoly. It is within this frame
work that the Miller appellate court decision will be critically
discussed.

71. See generally I M. NIMMER, supra note 28, at 2-28. See also supra note 35-40
and accompanying text.
72. I M. NIMMER, supra note 28, at 2-31 to 2-32.
73. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). "Under this definition 'copies' and 'phonorecords' to
gether will comprise all of the material objects in which copyrightable works are capable
of being fixed." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976).
74. See A. LATMAN, supra note 24, at 31-33.
75. M. PETERS, supra note 32, at 3:7.
76. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Baker v. Selden, WI U.S. 99 (1879).
In works of fiction, abstract outlines of the plot or characters are nonprotectible themes
or ideas and their use is not infringement of copyright. Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp.,45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cerro denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931). In historical or
biographical works the underlying content of facts are similarly treated as ideas and
denied protection. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d
303 (2d Cir. 1966).
77. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or dis
covery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied
in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976).
78. Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
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ANALYSIS

The Foundation ofthe Decisions

The Miller court premised its decision that research was not
copyrightable on three points. The first was that the distinction be
tween uncopyrightable facts and copyrightable expression of facts
provides the means for balancing the public interest in creative activ
ity against the public need for unrestrained access to information. 79
The second was that the holding would allow subsequent authors to
build upon prior accomplishments of others without duplication of
effort.80 The third premise was that to hold research copyrightable
would be to hold that the facts discovered as a result of research are
themselves copyrightable. 81
The court formulated these points by relying on two primary
sources of authority. In Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House,
Inc .,82 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit declared that
copyright law does not absolutely preclude an author "from saving
time and effort by referring to and relying upon prior published ma
terial."83 The Rosemont court reasoned that to forbid the use of
prior works as resource material for another's research would lead to
meaningless waste and inefficiency, possibly discouraging others
from undertaking the task and almost certainly resulting in the im
pairment of historical knowledge.84 The court also expressed a con
cern that an author cannot "acquire by copyright a monopoly in the
narration of historical events."85
The other primary source of authority for the Miller court was
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc. s6 In Hoehling, plaintiff had
written an historical account of the destruction of the German dirigi
ble' Hindenberg. In the account the author proposed the hypothesis
that the destruction of the dirigible was the result of sabotage by a
crew member motivated by political and romantic passion. 87 De
fendant later wrote a book advancing the same hypothesis and ad
mitted use of plaintiffs book as a research toops The Hoehling
79.
80.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

86.
87.
88.

650 F.2d at 1371.
Id. at 1372.
Id.
366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
Id. at 310.
Id.
Id. at 306.
618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cerl. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
Id. at 974-76.
'.
Id. at 976.
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court held that there had been no infringement, primarily because
the scope of copyright in historical accounts is narrow and embraces
no more than the author's original expression of particular facts and
theories already in the public domain. 89 The Hoehling court also
sought to avoid a chilling effect on future authors who might con
template tackling an historical event by declaring that broad latitude
must be granted to the subsequent author who makes use of prior
historical subject matter, including theories or plots. 90 The Miller
court relied on both Rosemont 9I and Hoehling 92 to formulate its
strongest argument against extension of copyright protection to re
search: that such protection would create a monopoly in factual ma
terial by the original author.93
The Miller decision was reached because of two basic concerns:
The law should not discourage other authors from attempting to pro
vide fresh insight into previously researched issues and events; and,
the law should not grant a monopoly to an author over facts and
theories. Each of these concerns originated from the distinction be
tween idea and expression in copyright law. 94 Facts, like ideas, may
never be subject to copyright protection. Facts are the raw material
of scholarly research and knowledge and, as such, must be protected
as the common property of all. 95
To reveal why the decision of the appellate court in Miller be
trays these basic concerns, its rationale must be compared with the
rationale of the trial court. The trial court did not seek to oppose the
89. ld. at 974. The Hoehling court was concerned about granting an author a mo
nopoly in historical facts.
The copyright provides a financial incentive to those who would add to the
corpus of existing knowledge by creating original works. Nevertheless, the pro
tection afforded the copyright holder has never extended to history, be it docu
mented fact or explanatory hypothesis. The rationale for this doctrine is that
the cause of knowledge is best served when history is the common property of
all, and each generation remains free to draw upon the discoveries and insights
ofthe past. Accordingly, the scope of copyright in historical accounts is narrow
indeed, embracing no more than the author's original expression of particular
facts and theories already in the public domain.
ld.
90. ld. at 978.
91. See supra notes 82-85.
92. See supra notes 86-90.
93. 650 F.2d at 1371-72.
94. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
95. 650 F.2d at 1369. For an analysis of the relationship between facts, the expres
sion of facts and the subject matter of copyrightable works, see I M. NIMMER, supra note
28, at 2-34; Denicola, Copyright in Collections 01 Facts: A Theory lor the Protection of
NonJiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516 (1981).
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basic tenet of copyright law. In his instructions to the jury, the trial
judge expressly stated that facts themselves are not copyrightable;
on"ty the form of expression of the facts, their arrangement, and se
lection are copyrightable. 96 The real distinction between the trial
and appellate court analyses rests in their definitions of the nature of
research and their interpretations of the value of the economic stim
ulus which copyright protection of research would afford the author.
The wisdom of the holding, which denies copyright protection to an
author's research, must also be examined in the light of the similarity
between research and the compilation of facts in a directory, to
which copyright protection has been expressly extended. Through
analysis of the appellate court's rationale, the wisdom of this deci
sion and the future impact it will exert on authors may be
ascertained .

.B.

The Essence of Research

A fundamental reason for the Miller court's denial of copyright
protection to research was the court's refusal to recognize research as
anything more than a collection of factual details. 97 The Miller court
failed to recognize that the substance of research is not merely the
collection of facts, but the interpretation and significance attributed
to the facts by the compiler.
The very act of compiling facts necessitates the selection of cer
tain details and the rejection of others. The researcher must make a
conscious decision to pursue a given path of investigation and to or
der facts in a unique style. Although any person may, in time, un
cover exactly the same facts as the original author, it is highly
improbable that the second author will uncover them in exactly the
same order and marshal them with precisely the same degree and
form of expression. The very nature of research is such that the
unique manner in which one uncovers the facts and information
must invariably lead to a substantial degree of self-expression in
compilations utilizing those facts. Not all authors engage in research
with the same degree of self-expression. To those who merely gather
facts with a minimum of analysis, a minimum of copyright protec
tion is afforded. 98 It must be stressed that only the expression of the
author may be protected. 99 The facts gathered during the research
96. 460 F. Supp. at 987.
97. 650 F.2d at 1372.
98. Accord 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
99. Although in the case of a compilation of facts, the labor of the compiler alone
may be sufficient to receive protection. See infra notes 123- 133 and accompanying text.
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are public property and may be freely used without restriction. To
declare flatly that no part of an author's research is entitled to copy
right protection is to grant a license to copy not only facts, but to
copy the self-expression of the author as well.
The nature of research was well illustrated in Wainwright Secur
ities, Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp .100 Plaintiff was an institu
tional analyst and stock broker who published in depth analytical
reports on industrial, financial, utility, and railroad corporations. 101
Defendant copied and published, in its newspapers, abstracts of
plaintiffs institutional research reports. In issuing an injunction to
prevent further publication by the defendant, the Wainwright court
held that there was verbatim appropriation of the plaintiffs copy
righted analytical research reports. The appropriated material in
cluded financial analyses and predictions, representing substantial
investment of time, money, and labor. 102 The court outlined the
scope of the rights protected and noted that when considering copy
right protection for a news event, it is important to differentiate be
tween the substance of the information contained in the report, that
is, the event itself and the particular form or collocation of words in
which the author has chosen to communicate it. 103 "What is pro
tected is the manner of expression, the author's analysis or interpre
tation of events, the way he structures his material and marshals
facts, his choice of words, and the emphasis he gives to particular
developments."I04 This is research: not simply the mindless collect
100. 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977).
101. Id. The reports examined a company's financial characteristics, trends in the
industry, major developments within the company, growth prospects and profit expecta
tions. The analyst'S conclusions and predictions were a major feature of the reports.
Often, such research reports required several months of preparation including interviews
of corporate officials. Id. at 93.
102. Id. at 95-97.
103. Id. at 95 (quoting International News Servo v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215,
234 (1918».
104. 558 F.2d at 95-96. "The essence of infringement lies in taking not a general
theme, but in appropriating the particular expression through similarities of treatment,
details, scenes, events and characterization." Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop,
533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir.), cerro denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976). In Wainwright, the court
criticized the defendant's appropriation for not providing independent analysis or re
search; for not soliciting comments on the same topics from other financial analysts; and
for not including any independent criticism, praise or other reaction from industry offi
cials or investors. 558 F.2d at 95-97. The Wainwright court was convinced that the de
fendant had contributed nothing of its own creativity to the research reports of the
plaintiff. Id. These reports were largely composed of facts available to anyone with the
diligence to compile them, and of analysis that was the creation of the author. Facts and
theories are not copyrightable, yet this was the substance of the plaintiffs research report
and was recognized by the court as copyrightable. The court granted copyright based on
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ing of facts, but analysis and interpretation of events as well as struc
turing material and organizing facts into a thesis with emphasis on
particular developments.
The research of an author in preparation for writing a book is
analogous to a financial research report. Both involve laborious col
lecting, organizing, and compiling of facts and data, including nu
merous interviews with principals and witnesses, and the
formulation of theories and predictions based on the facts and data
gathered. Both involve originality of expression and both should be
subject to copyright protection.
The 1976 Copyright Act seeks to protect the work of an author
as soon as the author's creative independent labor has assumed any
tangible mediuin of expression. lOS The goal of the 1976 Act is to
protect the original self-expression of the author from the instant the
created work comes into existence. 106 It seeks to abolish the pitfalls
of notice and registration which, in the past, have denied protection
to deserving authors. 107 If research truly involves more than a sterile
assemblage of facts, then to deny it copyright protection is directly
contrary to the goal of the 1976 Act. 108 Research contains self-ex
pression as soon as the researcher commits to paper the facts and
data which are the core of his future work. This self-expression de
serves immediate copyright protection. To postpone protection until
the work is published is to violate the purpose of the 1976 Act.
It is a court's task to determine the point at which research has
incorporated sufficient self-expression so as to be properly classified
as an author's work 109 and subject to copyright protection. The de
termination is an exercise in arbitrary line-drawing llO and will de
pend on the style of the individual author. Yet the line must be
drawn, and the point at which it is drawn will have a direct impact
on the work of the author. A possible explanation for Miller was a
the time, labor and expense spent in compiling the facts and data in the reports. Copy
right was also recognized to the degree that the analyst contributed originality of expres
sion to the financial data and the analysis and predictions of the corporation's future
prospects. Id.
105. A. LATMAN, supra note 24, at 12. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying
text.
106. A. LATMAN, supra note 24, at 12.
107. M. PETERS, supra note 32, at 10:1.
108. See supra text accompanying note 106.
109. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
110. Commenting on the necessity of line-drawing, Judge Learned Hand said,
"while we are as aware as anyone that the line, wherever it is drawn, will seem arbitrary,
that is no excuse for not drawing it; it is a question such as courts must answer in nearly
all cases." Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930).
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desire by the court to avoid such arbitrary line-drawing. When re
search is declared to be uncopyrightable, the line is drawn at the
time the manuscript is published. This, however, would be in direct
contradiction to both the spirit and the express provisions of the 1976
Copyright ACt. 111 The court desired to prevent a monopoly in fac
tual details and to avoid wasteful duplication of effort and re
sources. 112 The court achieved these goals declaring research to be
uncopyrightable, but at a price. The price was removal of the labor
and expense of conducting research from copyright protection.
C.

The Two Basic Concerns
Economic Incentive

0/ Copyright Law:

Monopoly and

The Miller court sought to prevent an author from acquiring a
monopoly in facts. I 13 Free access to factual material, even that ma
terial discovered by a previous author, was viewed as essential in
order to encourage future authors to investigate the same factual and
historical events. The court desired to prevent waste, inefficiency,
and duplication of effort. It reasoned that, since the facts discovered
by the first author are in the public domain, they are properly subject
to use by anyone and access to them will stimulate scholarly writing
by removing these impediments. I 14 Although its intentions are laud
able, the Miller court ignored the adverse effect that its ruling will
have on the original author. Without copyright protection, any sub
sequent author is free to copy verbatim the entire research of the
original author. Not only may names, dates and places be taken, but
any modicum of original interpretation or expression. In short,
everything put down on paper while conducting research can be ap
propriated and the original author is helpless to prevent the appro
priation. lls Such a result elicits two concerns: First, it is unfair; and,
second, few authors will undertake the labor of research without
some form of protection. In response to the first concern, inequity
Ill. The 1976 Act expressly provides that: "Copyright in a work . . .subsists from
its creation. . . ." 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976). No longer must an author publish his work
in order to be eligible for federal copyright protection. From the moment the work is
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, it is deemed to be created and automatically
subject to copyright. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 137-38 (1976).
112. 650 F.2d at 1371-72.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. The author would then be forced to tum to the tort claims of misappropria
tion and unfair competition for relief. For an excellent discussion of misappropriation,
see Mitchell, Misappropriation and the New Copyright Act: An Overview, 10 GOLDEN
GATE U.L. REV. 587 (1980).
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strikes to the heart of copyright protection. 116 As to the second con
cern, it violates reason and common sense to believe that anyone
would undertake a laborious and expensive research project without
protection from the law for the fruits of their legitimate effort.ll7
The Miller court declared that there must be a balance between
the rights of the individual author and the right of the public to free
and unfettered access to information. I IS A proper balance between
the two competing interests results in both protection and economic
incentive to the author, and a constant supply of scholarly knowl
edge and information to the public. This balance cannot be main
tained if the author is denied protection for his research, because
such denial is patently unjust and removes the incentive of economic
gam.
Fairness was the key to the decision in Toksvig v. Bruce Publish
ing Co .119 Plaintiff wrote a biography of Hans Christian Andersen,
consulting only sources written in Danish and expending three years
of extensive labor on the project. Defendant, who could not speak or
read Danish, consulted plaintiffs for facts and details of Andersen's
life and completed her work in one third the time that it had taken
plaintiff. 120 The court declared the issue to be not whether the later
biographer could have obtained the same information by going to
the same sources, but rather, whether she did in fact go to the same
sources and do her own independent research. 121 The Toksvig court's
finding of infringement was motivated by convictions of fairness and
equity.122 The lesson from Toksvig is as follows: If a subsequent
researcher has available to her all of the original sources, then, re
gardless of her relative ability she must utilize these sources indepen
dently, for the law will protect the honest labor of the original
author. Toksvig clearly protects the effort of the first researcher and
guarantees economic incentive, yet it is overzealous in its protection
of facts and unnecessarily hinders the labor of future authors. Some
courts may agree with Toksvig that equity should be the foremost
consideration and wasteful duplication of effort must be the neces
sary price to secure for authors the rewards of their labor. But such
116. See Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, ISO-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
117. 460 F. Supp. at 988.
118. 650 F.2d at 1371-72.
119. 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950).
120. Id. at 666.
121. Id. at 667.
122. Id. Query, whether the Toksvig court would have held the same way if the
original sources were written in English rather than Danish.
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draconian measures are not necessary. In extending copyright to re
search itself, only the original expression, order of presentation, and
method of reasoning need be protected. The individual facts are free
to be used by all. When research is protected by copyright, the origi
nal author is provided security for his effort in expression. Addition
ally, future authors are free to build upon the work of others without
the shackles of wasted resources and duplication of effort.
D.

The Copyright in Directories and Maps

In Miller, the court ignored the significance of copyright protec
tion granted to directories, claiming that they are unique and that
this special protection generally has not been extended to other fac
tual endeavors. 123 Under the statutory language of both the 1976
and 1909 Copyright Acts, directories have been granted express
copyright protection. 124 Directories are compilations as defined by
the 1976 Act. 125 It is the originality involved in the selection and
arrangement of facts which renders a compilation a protected liter
ary work. 126 At least one decision grants directories protection based
upon the labor and expense involved in collecting the facts.127 Al
though one might question the logic of extending copyright to such
compilations, such protection has long been recognized. 128 There is
some indication that the courts will regard a biography, history, or
other factual account as a directory based upon its judicious selec
123. 650 F.2d at 1370.
124. 17 U.S.c. § 102(a)(I) (1976); Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 5(a), 35 Stat.
1075. The House Committee Report specifically includes directories as literary works:
"The term 'literary works' does not connote any criterion of literary merit, or qualitative
value: it includes catalogs, directories, and similar factual, reference, or instructional
works and compilations of data." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976).
125. "A 'compilation' is a work formed by the collection and assembling of pre
existing materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that
the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship. . .." 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
126. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 28, at 2-40 to 2-42.
127. Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83, 88
(2d Cir. 1922). Copyright for a book does not depend on literary skill or originality in
either thought or language, but rather on the industrious labor expended in the gathering
of the data for the directory. Id.
128. See Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1977); Adven
tures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1942); Col
lege Entrance Book Co. v. Amsco Book Co., 119 F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1941); Leon v. Pacific
Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937); Rexnord, Inc. v. Modem Handling Systems,
379 F. Supp. 1190 (D.C. Del. 1974); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Nationwide Indep.
Directory Serv., 371 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Ark. 1974); Chain Store Business Guide, Inc. v.
Wexler, 79 F. Supp. 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
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tion and arrangement of facts. 129 If research is nothing but a compi
lation of facts and data devoid of any expression or interpretation,
then it must satisfy the definition of a compilation under the 1976
Act: a work created by the collection and assembling of facts and
data. 130 It is the very labor involved in collecting, organizing, and
compiling facts that must be protected. It is illogical to deny copy
right to research as so defined. In the case of maps, 131 copyright pro
tection will be granted as long as the originality consists largely of
information gathered by direct observation. 132 Once again, the stan
dard is that of original research and independent labor in the acqui
sition and compilation of the data necessary to draw the map. As the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit enunciated in Amsterdam v.
Triangle Publications, Inc., 133 ''the presentation of information avail
able to everybody, such as is found on maps, is protected only when
the publisher of the map in question obtains originally some of that
information by the sweat of his own broW."134 The analogy to the
labor essential in any successful research is inescapable.
The common thread running throughout the cases of directories
and maps is protection for the time, expense, and labor expended in
the collection and collation of facts and data. 135 Since copyright
cannot protect the facts themselves, it must shift the protection to the
honest labor of the compiler. Without such protection, few would
undertake to compile a directory or draw a map since the substantial
labor necessary to complete the task might be sacrificed by the
wholesale appropriation of the work by a copier. Under this theory
aloIle, research should be granted similar protection since it involves
essentially similar labor with comparative results.
The Miller court suggested that it would be better to recognize
the directory cases as in a category by themselves and not to extend
129. See Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications, 246 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.), UrI. denied,
355 U.S. 907 (1957); Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row Publishers, 413 F. Supp. 385
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Huie v. National Broadcasting Co., 184 F. Supp. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
Triangle Publications v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 198 (D.
Mass. 1942).
130. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
131. See A. LATMAN, supra note 24, at 59-60.
132. The direct observation rule was first expressly articulated in Amsterdam v.
Triangle Publications, 189 F.2d 104, 106 (3rd Cir. 1951). See also Alaska Map Service,
Inc. v. Roberts, 368 F. Supp. 578, 579 (D. Alaska 1973); Marken & Bielfeld, Inc. v.
Baughman Co., 162 F. Supp. 561, 563 (E.D. Va. 1957).
133. 189 F.2d 104 (3rd Cir. 1951).
134. Id. at 106.
135. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
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their rationale to non directory cases. 136 The case cited by the court to
support this proposition was the landmark decision of International
News Service v. The Associated Press,137 in which the news gathered
and reported at the plaintiffs expense was copied and sold by the
defendant. 138 The Supreme Court in International News Service
held that the plaintiffs right to protection lay in a claim of unfair
competition by the defendant and rested on the inequity of allowing
another to profit from the labor of the plaintiff in gathering the
news.139 The character of the disputed property in International
News Service can be distinguished from Miller in two ways. First,
the stories sought to be protected were in the form of the barest de
tails telegraphed to the individual newspapers and, at the moment of
infringement, not in the form of a publishable story.140 Second, the
value of the details depended upon their current newsworthiness. 141
International News Service is inapposite to Miller because the event
depicted in the Miller book had long ceased to be current news and
the research involved in writing the book consisted not only of facts,
but of considerable self-expression as well. The Miller court's rea
soning supports the conclusion that research for a book is similar to
the collection of facts in a directory and not analogous to the gather
ing of facts describing a current news event. The rationale of copy
right in directories and maps should, therefore, logically extend to
the research necessary for the writing of a book.

E. The Expansive Interpretation

of "Writings"

Another reason for holding that research is entitled to copyright
protection is the expansive interpretation given by the courts to
the term "writings of an author."142 In Rubin v. Boston Magazine
136. 650 F.2d at 1370.
137. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
138. Id. at 230-31.
139. Id. The Court could not allow the plaintiff to claim copyright in news stories
that consisted of factual details. To allow the defendant, however, to pirate the stories
would be both unjust and would discourage the plaintiff from continuing to gather and
report the news. The Court preserved the rationale of copyright by declaring that de
fendant's copying was unfair competition, thus achieving the same result. Id. at 241-42.
For a more detailed analysis of unfair competition and misappropriation, see Mitchell,
supra note 115. For a detailed analysis of the scope of copyright in factual and historical
matters, see Gorman, Copyrigltt Protectionlor tlte Collection and Representation of Facts,
76 HARV. L. REV. 1569 (1963).
140. 248 U.S. at 229-30.
141. Id. at 230-31. That is, the details would not be worth publishing merely one
day later.
142. See, e.g., International News Servo V. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234
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Co .,143 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated that the term
"writings" as used in the Constitution and the copyright statutes is
intended to be read expansively, so as to include all the writings of
an author.l44 In Goldstein v. California 145 the Supreme Court
granted an extensively broad interpretation to the term "writings,"
declaring it to include works far removed from literary produc
tions. l46 The Supreme Court in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony 147 had stated that the term "writings" in the Copyright
Clause of the Constitution embraces "all forms of writing, printing,
engraving, etching, etc., by which the ideas in the mind of the author
are given visible expression."148 The ideas contained in the compila
tion of factual details are given visible expression by the very act of
research.
A significant feature of the trend toward an ever expanding in
terpretation of the term "writings" has been the slow but steady
change in the nature and use of most copyrighted works. When the
first copyright legislation was passed in 1790,149 the business world
had not yet acquired the services of books, art and music, because
the writings of authors were generally confined to instruction or en
tertainment. 150 But gradually, copyright has been expanded, particu
larly under judicial construction, to accommodate the growing needs
of commerce. 151 Today it includes works which the writers and art
ists of post-revolutionary America would have disdained. 152
IV.

CONCLUSION

The intent of the 1976 Copyright Act was to protect the writings
of authors from the instant that the created work came into exist
ence. As a form of writing, the research of an author is deserving of
(1918); Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1938); Reiss v. National Quotation
Bureau, 276 F. 717, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
143. 645 F.2d 80 (1st Cir. 1981).
144. Id. at 83.
145. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
146. Id. at 561.
147. 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
148. Id. at 58.
149. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
150. A. LATMAN, supra note 24, at 19-21.
151. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 2\0 n.15 (1954); Goldstein v. California, 412
U.S. at 561.
152. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, III U.S. at 58; American Mu
toscope & Biograph Co. v. Edison Mfg. Co., 137 F. 262, 266-67 (C.C.D. N.J. 1905) (both
photographs and motion pictures are subject to copyright protection, yet neither were
known to the drafters of the Constitution).
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such protection. Research contains the self-expression of the author.
The substance of research is the interpretation and significance at
tributed to the facts and data gathered by the author. Since it is only
the self-expression of the author which may be protected by copy
right, the facts gathered during research are the property of all and
may be used without restriction. To declare that no part of an au
thor's research is entitled to copyright protection is to grant a license
to copy not only facts, but to steal the self-expression of the author as
well. Such a result is in direct violation of the purpose of the 1976
Copyright Act.
Without copyright protection, an author must conduct his re
search in the fear that his honest labor might be stolen by another.
Copyright law was designed to promote intellectual effort through
the protection of economic gain. Should this protection be removed,
few authors would undertake the labor and expense of research. In
extending copyright protection to the research of an author, a proper
balance is struck between the rights of an individual author and the
right of the public to free access to information. Such a balance re
sults in both economic incentive to the author, and a constant supply
of scholarly knowledge and information to the public. The produc
tion of such works was the primary goal of the copyright law.
Tim Suich

